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THE IMPLIED POWER OF NATIONAL BANKS TO ISSUE
LETTERS OF CREDIT AND ACCEPT BILLS
RUFUS J. TRIMBLEf
TnE scope of the implied powers of National Banks is a recurrent
issue as the functions of banks continue to grow with new develop-
ments in business, and as the banks which are under less conservative
management extend their services into fields farther and farther re-
moved from established banking practices.' Recently it has become
necessary to reexamine the nature of the implied powers of National
Banks in order to defend their power to issue sight and time letters of
credit.2 The letter of credit has in the past few years become a major
t Member of the New York and Texas Bars.
1. See New York Atty. Gen. Goldstein's opinion of Jan. 20, 1947, that New Yorl:
banks may not carry on a travel agency business, N.Y. BxG. LAW § 96 note 17 (Mcminney,
1948 Supp.); cf. Rule No. 67 of the Comptroller of the Currency, C.C.H. Fm. BxGa. LAvW
REP. 90,426 (1947). The power of banks "to extend their functions and perform serv-
ices formerly foreign to the banking business" (Dyer v. Broadway Central Bank, 252 N.Y.
430, 433, 169 N.E. 635, 636 (1930)) is best justified when it is exercised merely in new
applications of an old power inherent in the business of banking, such as a bank's power
to lend its credit. Block v. Pennsylvania Exch. Bk., 253 N.Y. 227, 230, 170 X.E. 900, 901
(1930) ; ef. Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N.Y. 394, 40G, 138 N.E. 33, 37 (1923) ;
Bank of California v. Portland, 157 Ore. 203, 69 P.2d 273 (1937), cert. dcnicd, 302 U.S.
765 (1938) (safe-deposit-box business held now within the implied banding powers of
national banks); Henderson v. Henderson, 109 F2d 863, S66 (9th Cir. 1940); Airx,u
CASES o BILLS AND Norms 74 n. 21 (1947). The legality of any other new functions
is not relevant to the subject of this article.
2. In the view of the writer, a letter of credit (sometimes formerly called a bill of
credit) is a written communication (including such a writing as a cablegram) which (in
the circumstances in which it is sent) shows the intent of the issuer (the writer or sender)
to request a third party (the correspondent), specifically or as one or more of a group,
to pay money, or to make the correspondent's credit available, to a beneficiary named
therein, upon the credit of or against payment by the issuer. (It is usually addressed to
the beneficiary or the correspondent.) It has some similarity to the bill of exchange
(drawn upon the correspondent to the order of the beneficiary) but it is a request, not an
order, is usually conditional, and need not require a payment in cash to the baneficiary (of
a sum certain or other sum), or be limited to being honored on demand or, in the alter-
native, at a fixed or determinable future time. A mere advice from a ban: that it will
honor drafts drawn upon it by the addressee normally implies the necessary request, to
any (unnamed) negotiator of the drafts, in order to constitute the advice a letter of credit
and to create a direct and primary obligation from the bank to each such negotiator. A
sale of property upon credit to one, at another's request and upon his joint or secondary
responsibility, is not a making of the seller's "credit available" to the buyer withfi this
definition. See Trimble, The Law Mcrchant and The Letter of Credit, 61 HRNv L. 1zm.
981, 999 n. 70, 1003 n. 84, 1004 and n. 89 (1948) ; Mechanics Bank v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R.,
13 N.Y. 599, 629-30 (1856). A mere promise in writing to accept a bill of exchange is
not a letter of credit. Finkelstein, Acceptances and Promises to Accept, 26 COL L. IRM.
684 (1926); see Germania Nat. Bk. v. Taaks, 101 N.Y. 442, 5 N.E. 76 (18!); Banco
Nacional Ultramarino v. First Nat. Bk., 289 Fed. 169, 173-4, 176 (D. Mass. 1923).
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instrument in financing the domestic sales of motor vehicles. In that
connectiofA it usually provides for the drawing of sight drafts there-
under. In view of its lax use by a few banks in an over-extension or
other abuse of credit, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
has been considering the intrinsic power of National Banks to issue
letters of credit and the limitations upon such power. In doing so the
view has been expressed, in accordance with all of the leading authori-
ties on the subject up to 1948, that National Banks acquired from the
Federal Reserve Act their power to issue letters of credit which provide
for acceptances, and that they, therefore, have no authority to issue
letters of credit providing for acceptances of types other than those
specifically described in the Federal Reserve Act. An essential of this
reasoning is that prior to the enactment of that Act, National Banks
had no power to accept time drafts. It has also been asserted that
National Banks had no power to issue a sight letter of credit except
against receipt of cash, in the amount of the letter, at the time of its
issuance. The bank supervisory authorities in one or more of the states
have raised similar issues as to the powers of state banks. Counsel for a
number of National Banks and banking organizations have filed
memoranda in support of the power of National Banks to continue
to finance a great part of our international trade, and a substantial
part of our domestic trade, through sight and time letters of credit.
In the consideration heretofore given to the principles governing
the implied powers of National Banks, particularly as they relate to
the issuance of letters of credit, one approach to the determination of
the scope of the implied powers of National Banks has been largely
overlooked in the decisions and by textwriters. The subject of the
particular power of National Banks to issue letters of credit has pre-
sented a beautiful example of the universal tendency of men to accept
as truth, and as a conclusion reached by reason, any proposition that
has been sufficiently reiterated, especially when it has been reiterated
by those learned in the field. With respect to that specific power, our
leading authors on banking and banking law have stated that National
Banks did not have lawful authority to issue letters of credit, providing
for time acceptances, prior to the enactment of the Federal Reserve
Act conferring that power upon them in December 1913.1 With respect
to the broad question of the determination of the implied powers of
3. Neidle and Bishop, Commercial Letters of Credit: Effect of Suspension of Is-
suing Bank, 32 CoL. L. REv. 1, 4 n. 8 (1932) ; FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMEA-
crAL LETTEas oF CREDIT 5 n. 7 (1930) ; WHITAKER, FOREIGN EXCHANGE 134 n. 1 (1919) ;
YORK, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE 298 (1923); WARD, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL CREDITS
15 (1st ed. 1922); see KNIFFEN, COMMERCIAL BANKING 778 (1923); WILLIS, Tn FRD-
ERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 981 (1923) ; WILLIS & STEINER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKING PR.AC-
TICE 463 (1926); KEMMERER, TE ABC OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 48 (9th cd.
1932); RUFENER, MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 520 (1934); BURGESS,
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National Banks, it has been frequently stated that the powers of
National Banks are only the powers that are expressly conferred upon
them by statute and those powers which, by necessity (in a broad
sense), are incidental to such express powers.
4
THE RESERv BANKS AND THE MNoINE M.RET 157 (rev. ed. 1936) ; RFI, MonEy, CcR-
RENcY AND BArING 493 (1942).
Contra, WARD AND HARFID, BANK CEDrrS AND ACcrW.EPA::cEs iN IN AYIo:;,
AND DosmExsnc TpLDE 88 (1948).
4. Another way of stating substantially the same narrow construction is that the
implied powers of National Banks are confined to those powers which are incidental to
the business of banking as defined and limited by the express powers. Weckler v. First
Nat. Bk., 42 M_%d. 581, 591-3 (1875). The opposing view: is that National Banhs have
all implied powers incidental to carrying on the banking business and no such power need
be incidental to any one of the express powers.
The narrower view apparently emanates from ambiguous statements by 'Mr. jutice
Harlan in Logan County National Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 73-4 1(S91). He
stated: "It is undoubtedly true ... that a national Bank cannot rightfully exercise any
powers except those expressly granted by that act, or such incidental powers as are
necessary to carry on the business of banking for which it was established." It is not
clear from this whether he meant that the implied powers must be incidental to the e:preqs
powers or to the business of banking, but later he states: "In the view we take of this
case, it is unnecessary. . . to discuss the authorities cited to show that such a contract
...is not embraced by any of the clauses of the statute specifying the different modes by
which a national bank may carry on the business of banking" and thereby shows that he
limited the implied powers to those powers which are incidental to the specifically ex-
pressed powers.
The first quoted passage from the Logan County Ban!: case was repeated by Mr.
Justice White in California (National) Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 356 (1897), ap-
parently with the same meaning that implied powers must be incidental to the enumerated
powers. Mr. Justice White used in a single paragraph two inconsistent statements. He
first stated at p. 366: ". . . they cannot rightfully exercise any powers excerpt those e::-
pressly granted, or which are incidental to carrying on the basiness for -.O'ich they are
established" (italics supplied), which would include powers not incidental t,. the specific
powers. He followed with the inconsistent statement that: "The prohibiticn is implied
from the failure to grant the power." The paragraph has been frequently cited. First Nat.
Bk. v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425, 438-9 (190G) ; Concord First Nat. Bk. v. Hav,'kins, 174
U.S. 364, 367 (1899).
The Logan County Bank case vas cited by Mr. Justice Sutherland, in First National
Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924), where he stated: "The extent of the powers
of national banks is to be measured by the terms of the federal statutes relating to such
associations, and they can rightfully exercise only such as are expressly granted or such
incidental powers as are necessary to carry on the business for which they are established."
It would appear that in this ambiguous sentence he used the term "incidental powers"
to mean only such powers as are incidental to the express powers granted, and that a
bank's implied powers do not include all such incidental powers but only those incidental
to the enumerated powers which are also necessary to carry on the business of banking;
for he later states at p. 659: "Certainly an incidental power can avail . . . only to carry
into effect those which are granted." The term "granted" must mean "expressly granted"
for otherwise this statement would be completely tautological; if the "granted" powers
did not mean "expressly" granted, the "granted" powers would include all lawful inci-
dental powers and there could be no additional incidental powers. Cf. Texas & Pacific
Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253-4 (1934). In Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Band, 295
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It is submitted that neither of these propositions is the law. While
it may be conceded that the power to issue letters of credit is not in-
cidental to any power expressly conferred upon National Banks by
statute 5 (or charter), it is submitted that National Banks have always
had, and continue to have, implied power to issue letters of credit pro-
viding for payment of sight drafts and for the acceptance and pay-
ment of time drafts.
The direct acceptance of bills of exchange, and the issuance, against
payment of cash or upon credit, of sight and time letters of credit, were
incidents of the banking business carried on by the early British banks
and other banks and bankers. By virtue of the provisions of the New
York Banking Act of 1838,6 as interpreted by the New York Court of
Appeals, New York banks possessed all powers necessary or appro-
priate to carry on such a banking business. It appears from the terms
and legislative history of the National Bank Act of 1864,1 that National
U.S. 209, 211 (1935), Mr. Justice Stone expressed a similar, and again somewhat am-
biguous, view: "Revised Statutes, § 5136, authorizes national banks to carry on a banking
business and defines their powers."
The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in Kimen v. Atlas Exchange Nat. Bk., 92
F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650 (1937), while expressing con-
flicting concepts, clarified the meaning of these restrictive dicta. The court began upon
the sound premise that: "National banks may rightfully exercise only such powers as are
expressly granted and such as are necessarily incidental to the effectuation of their chart-
ered purposes;" but then made its conflicting conclusion fairly clear. It stated: "Inci-
dental powers can avail neither to create powers which expressly or by reasonable
implications are withheld nor to enlarge the powers granted. They are inferred and exist
only to carry into effect such powers as are granted," and held as to a repurchase agree-
ment: "To our minds such agreements are no part of the express power of a national bank
or in any way incidental to the effectuation thereof. Rather they seem to us wholly be-
yond any express or implied grant of powers by the Congress." (Italics supplied). See
'Note, 24 CoL. L. REv. 633, 636 (1924) : "Nor can the bankers' acceptance be saved by the
clauses granting incidental powers, for these have been construed to mean powers inci-
dental to those expressly enumerated . . . ," citing Seligman & Co. v. Charlottesville
Nat. Bk., 21 Fed. Cas. 1036, 1039 (C.C. W.D. Va. 1879) where the court, in holding
that a guaranty by a National Bank was idtra vires, expressed the dictum: "But the
incidental powers given are not the incidental powers given generally to all banking in-
stitutions; but only such as are incidental to banks allowed to do such things as are pre-
scribed by the statute .... " See also Wyatt, Right of National Banks to Act as Tra,:s-
fer Agents, 7 VA. L. REv. 594, 597-8 (1921). For cases contra, see infra, note 27.
A typical statement of this narrow interpretation with respect to state banks is that of
the court in O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920, 933, 289 N.Y. Supp. 252,
270 (1936), aff'd without opinion, 278 N.Y. 649, 16 N.E.2d 302 (1938) : "The question,
therefore, is whether the agreement here claimed comes within the implied or incidental
powers of the banks. Is the agreement incidental to the exercise of the express statutory
powers?" See, also, Farmers and Mechanics Bk. v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, 203 (1876);
Mathews v. Skinker, 62 Mo. 329, 331 (1876).
5. See Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., 108 Iowa 333, 79 N.W. 68 (1899). But
see WARD AND HARFIELD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 88.
6. N.Y. Laws 1838, c. 260.
7. 13 SWAT. 99 (1864).
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Banks were granted all the powers of New York banks under the Act
of 1838 as interpreted by the New York courts, except as they were
specifically modified by the National Bank Act. These lawful powers
are necessarily retained by National Banks except in so far as subse-
quent statutes may have eliminated or restricted them. Apart from
any application of the statutory limitations upon the total obligations
of a single obligor to a National Bank,8 and upon the amount of liabil-
ities that may be incurred by a National Bank,' subsequent statutes,
with the possible exception of the Federal Reserve Act, have not
restricted any powers of National Banks, under the National Bank
Act, to accept bills, or issue letters of credit. The Federal Reserve Act
(Section 13) 10 limits the bills of exchange that a member bank (which
term includes all National Banks) has authority to accept directly,
possibly including acceptances drawn under its letters of credit, but it
seems that it does not affect acceptances drawn against correspondent
banks under letters of credit issued by member banks. It follows that
it is not ultra vires for a National Bank to issue, upon credit or for cash,
a sight letter of credit, or a time letter of credit providing for accept-
ances by it, which conform to the terms of Section 13 of the Federal
Reserve Act; and, it seems, a National Bank may issue letters of credit
providing for acceptances by correspondent foreign banks which do
not conform with that Section." These conclusions are sustained by a
study of the law in detail.
THE NATIONAL BANi. AcT OF 1864
Section 8 of the National Bank Act of 164 provided that a National
Bank might exercise:
". .. all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking by discounting and negotiating promissory
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by
receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bul-
lion; by loaning money on personal security; by obtaining, issuing,
and circulating notes according to the provisions of this act;
" 12
From the time of the enactment of the original National Bank Act
of 1864, there has been no express statutory authorization of any nature
whatsoever for a National Bank to issue a letter of credit. The above
quoted provisions have remained substantially unchanged and are con-
8. RV. STAT. § 5200 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1946).
9. REv. STAT. § 5202 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1946).
10. 38SrAT.251 (1913), 12 U.S.C.§221 (1946).
11. Reasoning which supports this conclusion is contained in the able article by
Henry Harfield, The National Bank Act and Foreign Trade Practices, 61 HAnv. L. Pm,.
782, 790-803 (1948).
12. 13 STAr. 99, 101 (1864).
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tained in the first sentence of paragraph "Seventh" of Section 5136,
United States Revised Statutes." These terms were derived from the
Banking Law of New York.
As the court said in Curtis v. Leavitt,'4 Chapter 260 of the Laws of the
State of New York of 1838 inaugurated a new and improved system
of banking in that state. Section 18 of that Chapter was as follows:
"§ 18. Such association shall have power to carry on the bust-
ness of banking, by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of
debt; by receiving deposites (sic); by buying and selling gold and
silver bullion, foreign coins, and bills of exchange, in the manner
specified in their articles of association for the purposes authorized
by this act; by loaning money on real and personal security; and by
exercising such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
such business; to choose one of their number as president of such
association, and to appoint a cashier, and such other officers and
agents as their business may require, and to remove such president,
cashier, officers and agents at pleasure, and appoint others in
their place."
This section remained unamended at the time of the enactment of the
National Bank Act of 1864.
In 1857, the Court of Appeals of New York, in Curtis v. Leavitt,
definitely settled the law of that state as to the implied powers of New
York banks under the above quoted terms of the New York statute. It
held that the powers of New York banks were limited only by the scope
of the banking business, and that their implied powers were not con-
fined to powers necessarily incident to those specifically listed in Sec-
tion 18 of the Law of 1838.1 The court expressly rejected 11 the view
that the implied powers were so confined. This remains the law except
in so far as relatively recent specific statutory enactments may have
limited the powers of New York banks. 7
13. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1946). The only changes have been that a semi-colon has been
inserted after the word "banking," the word "and" has been inserted preceding the word,
"by obtaining," and the word "act" has been changed to "title."
14. 15 N.Y. 9 (1857). The court reviewed (pp. 75-9) the history of the New York
statute.
15. The decision clarified the dicta in Talmadge v. Pell, 7 N.Y. 328, 340, 343, 344
(1852) which, however, included the statement as to New York banks: "All these powern
are incident to the express power to conduct the business of banking." Id. at 343.
16. 15 N.Y. 9, 262-71 (1857).
17. See Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N.Y. 115 (1884). In support of its holding, the
court in the Curtis case referred to the nature of the banking business, which it held the
New York banks were authorized to carry on, stating (p. 52) that: "Banking is not In
its nature a corporate franchise. In the absence of legislative restraints, it may be carried
on by individuals and partnerships in all its departments ... ;" and in reference to the
powers listed in Section 18 of the New York Law of 1838, the court concluded as to the
authority conferred thereby (p. 54): "I know of no broader terms in the English lariguago
to define 'the business of banking' . . ." Similarly, Justice Brown, concurring on these
[Vol. 58: 713
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It seems clear that among the implied banking powers of New York
banks was the power to accept bills. Mr. Justice Paige, in his concur-
ring opinion in Curtis v. Leavitt,"8 relied on the following citation as
authority for such an implied power of New York banks:
"Best, J., in Broughton v. Salford Water-Works (3 Barn. & Aid.
1, 11), says: 'When a company like the Bank of England or East
India Company are incorporated for the purposes of trade, it
seems to result, from the very object of their being, that they should
have power to accept bills . ..
Since under the decision of Curtis v. Leavitt, the New York banks
had all powers incident to the banking business, and since the banking
business (as practiced by British and other European banks for over
200 years) included the issuance of letters of credit and the acceptance
of bills of exchange, the New York banks had legal authority to simi-
larly issue letters of credit and accept bills.
The National Bank Act of 1864 was preceded by the Act enacted
February 25, 1863 which first provided for a national banking system.
Section 11 of the 1863 Act adopted verbatim (with two irrelevant
changes) the powers set forth in Section 18 of the New York Banking
Law.19 The National Bank Act of 1864 adopted, with only one relevant
change, the terms of the 1863 Act, which in turn were substantially
the terms of the New York statute of 1838. This change was the trans-
position of the clause: "such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on such business" from the end of the recital of powers in the
1863 Act (and the New York statute), to the beginning of such re-
cital, and the consequent elimination of the original beginning clause:
"power to carry on the business of banking." :  It would appear that
points, said (p. 159) as to the power to borrow, which was not included in the e.'press
powers of the statute: "I am unable to see why borrowing, under such circumstances, is
to be deemed an act ultra zires . . ." In 1827, a statement of principles similar to those
reflected in the 1838 Act, had contained the following: "Banking is a free trade in Eo far
that it may be freely entered into by individuals or associations under the provisions of a
general statute." KNox, Hismroy or BAmNING 94 (1st ed. 1900).
18. 15 N.Y. 9, 218 (1857).
19. It added to the power to carry on the business of banking, the words "by obtain-
ing and issuing circulating notes in accordance with the provisions of this act" (a power
provided elsewhere in the New York law) ; transferred the clause "in the manner specified
in their articles of association, for the purposes authorized by this act," and added a pro-
vision as to the location of banking offices. In support of the bill which became the Act
of 1863, it was explained that: "The bill in all its essential features is like the free banl:-
ing law of the State of New York, which has been in successful operation in that State
since 1838 ;" and that it was "a proposition to nationalize the banking system of the State
of New York . . ." Congressman Baker stated: "I would like to see all the States of the
Union adopt the free banking system of the State of New York in its present completeness
and perfection." CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1114, 1142 (1863).
20. The terms of the New York statute were slightly ambiguous upon the point
whether "incidental" powers were limited to those which were incidental to the specific
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the transposition was made primarily to avoid redundancy by the
elimination of one of the two clauses as to the "power to carry on the
business of banking," and that it was not the intent of Congress
thereby to make a major change in the existing powers of National
Banks, namely, to take from them all their implied powers to carry on
the business of banking which were not necessarily incidental to carry-
ing out the specific powers, and which implied powers were granted to
them by the 1863 Act.
21
It follows that the National Bank Act of 1864 adopted in substance
the td-ms conferring the banking powers contained in the New York
Banking Act of 1838 and that Congress intended to confer upon Na-
tional Banks all the powers of New York banks to carry on the bank-
ing business, except as such powers were clearly modified by the Na-
tional Bank Act. Such an intention falls within the rule that when
Congress enacts a statute in terms that have theretofore received a
settled interpretation by the courts (or even by administrative rulings
or practice) it in effect adopts that interpretation. 2 Under that rule,
National Banks organized under the National Bank Act have the same
broad powers to carry on the banking business as the New York banks
had under the decisions of the courts of that state prior to 1863.23
powers, or included all those powers which were incidental to the business of banking.
The ambiguity, however, was resolved by the holding of the New York courts that the
incidental powers to carry on the business of banking were not limited to those incidental
to the specific powers, and any continuation of ambiguity by the transposition of clauses in
the National Bank Act of 1864 would seem immaterial. The other changes by the Act
of 1864 were that it substituted the words "and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills
of exchange," for the words "bills, notes," substituted the words "exchange, coin, and
bullion" for "gold and silver bullion, foreign coins and bills of exchange," omitted the
words "real and" (the limited powers to deal with real property being dealt with else-
where in the Act-Sec. 28), and omitted the transferred clause quoted in note 19 supra.
21. That there was no such intention, seems clear from the First Annual Report of
the Comptroller of the Currency, Nov. 28, 1863 (contained in the Report of the See. of
the Treas., 1863, p.' 49) which recommended the revision of the 1863 Act. It appears
therefrom that National Banks were to retain substantially the powers of the New York
Banks, (p. 54) ; Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940) ; First Nat. Bk.
v. Nat. Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875). Moreover, ". . . repeals by implication are not
favored," U. S. v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). The amendment of the 1864
Act by the insertion of a semi-colon after the word "banking," see note 13 supra, is it
slight indication that Congress has interpreted that Act as granting "all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking"-which is the first
clause of the Act. It would appear that in chartering the First and tie Second Bank of
the United States, Congress contemplated that the banks would carry on the same banking
business that individuals might conduct. See CLARKE AND HALL, HIsrYnv OF THE BANIX
OF THE UNITED STATES 738, (§ 7) 803-4, 807-8 (1832).
22. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100 (1939). The rule applies to the
adoption of a statute from another jurisdiction. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION
§ 5209 (3d ed. 1943).
23. It appears that due either to ignorance of the law to this effect, or to an archaic
fear of corporate power, the current draft of a model state banking law, of the American
(Vol. 58: 713
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Therefore, whatever may be the legal rule as to business corpora-
tions, or municipal corporations,2 4 it seems clear that National Banks
are not confined to the powers specified in the National Bank Act and
those necessary to carry out those specific powers; 25 and that in the
case of National Banks, whatever might be the inclination of a bu-
reaucratic mind in a bank supervisory authority to limit banking
power, the test is not whether a power is necessarily incident to one
of the specific powers granted, but whether it is properly implied from
all the terms used, in the light of the general intent and purpose of the
statute.2 That a National Bank has all the implied powers necessary
to carry on the banking business was the rule originally stated by the
Supreme Court, 27 and it is unfortunate that it has been obscured by the
Bankers Association, omits any general grant of power to carry on the business of banking,
such as that possessed by National Banks (and banks of those states which adopted the
original free banking system of the State of New York), and confines the powers of
banks incorporated under the suggested statute to the few specific powers severally granted
thereby. See Section 20, and note, of the September 194 Tcntathe Draft Model State
Bankhing Code of the Special Committee of the American Bankers Association.
24. 'Merrill v. 'Monticello, 138 U.S. 673, 691-2 (1891).
25. Bank of California v. City of Portland, 157 Ore. 203, 69 P.2d 273 (1937).
26. Such a rule is similar to the rule for interpreting certain of the ccnstitution-l
powers of the Federal Government--the full authority of Congress does nmt derive from
an express grant alone but from "all the related powers conferred upon the Congress and
appropriate to achieve 'the great objects for which the government was framed." Norman
v. B. & 0. P. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935) ; cf. Travis, An Epoch in Mhe History of NTa-
tional Banking Associations, 12 IND. L. J. 369 (1937) : ". . . such associations enjoy only
the statutory powers granted them and such incidental powers as may be necessary to
carry out the intent and purpose for which the express powers are conferrl.' In Mer-
cantile (Nat.) Bk. v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 154 (187) the Court said vith respewt
to the National Bank Act: "The key to the proper interpretation of the act of Congress
is its policy and purpose."
27. See Aldrich v. Chemical National Bank, 176 U.S. 618, 626, 627 (196) where
the Court said that a National Bank has the incidental power to borrow money in accord-
ance with the usage of communities. There was considerable confusion as to the implied
powers of corporations prior to 1863. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 517, 519 n. 1,
587 (U.S. 1839) ; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 300, 322 (U.S. 1848). In its fear of
the corporate form, one Court did not deny such an extreme statement as that an ordinary
business corporation "is strictly limited to the exercise of those powers, which are specifi-
cally conferred on it." Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 151, 167 (U.S. 1830). It seems clear,
however, that in the first cases subsequent to the enactment of the National Bank Act of
1864, the Supreme Court recognized that National Banks had all the implied powers
necessary to carry on the business of banking and were not limited to those which were
incidental to their express powers.
In Bullard v. National Eagle Bank, 18 Wall. 5S9, 593 (U.S. 1873 ), the Court said
merely: "The extent of the powers of National banking associations is to be measurcd
by the act of Congress under which such associations are organized." The case has a,-en
cited for the proposition that implied powers were limited to those incidental to the
enumerated powers, but the Supreme Court made its contrary meaning clear two years
later in First Nat. Bk. v. Nat. Exchange Bk., 92 U.S. 122 (1875). In that case, counsel
argued that every power not enumerated in Section 8 of the National Banl: Act was as
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language of that Court in a number of erroneous dicta since 1890.28
The implied power of National Banks to issue letters of credit is
derived from the practice of New York banks prior to 1863, as well as
much withheld as if it were in express terms prohibited, and that incidental powers must
partake of the same character as the specifically granted powers and not enlarge them.
However, the Court held with reference to the terms of Section 8: "Authority is thus
given to transact such a banking business as is specified, and all incidental powers neces-
sary to carry it on are granted. These powers are such as are required to meet all the
legitimate demands of the authorized business, and to enable a bank to conduct its affairs,
within the general scope of its charter, safely and prudently. This necessarily implies
the right of a bank to incur liabilities in the regular course of its business, as well as to
become the creditor of others . . . Banks may do, in this behalf, whatcver natural persons
could do under like circwmstances:' Id. at 127. (Italics supplied). See Third Nat. Bk.
v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 61 (1875): "Such a contract does not appear to be authorized by
the terms of the 8th section [of the National Bank Act of 1864], as a transaction 'within
the ordinary course and business of banking or incident to it' . . ." This statement
clarified ambiguities in the opinion in Weckler v. First Nat. Bk., 42 Md. 581, 593 (1875),
in which the court correctly relied upon the New York law as determinative of the powers
of National Banks, pointing out: "This 8th section is almost identical in terms (and as
respects the present question, completely so) with the Banking Act of New York, of
1838, ch. 260 . . . ;" but erroneously relied upon that part of the dicta in Talmadge v.
Pell, 7 N.Y. 328 (1852), to the effect that implied powers of New York banks were not
those incident to the business of banking, but were those which were both incidental to
the express powers and necessary to transact the business defined by the express powers,
instead of citing and relying upon the later case of Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1857), to
the contrary.
In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Smith, 56 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir, 1932), the court
relied on the 1875 decision in First Nat. Bk. v. Nat. Exch. Bk., 92 U.S. 122 (1875), and
after quoting paragraph 7 of Rr:v. STAT. § 5136, stated: "Power is thus given to conduct a
banking business and all incidental power necessary to carry it on . ." Accord: Colorado
Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48 (1940) ; Dunn v. McCoy, 113 F.2d 587, 588-9 (3d Cir.
1940); Williams v. Merchants' Nat. Bk., 42 F.2d 243, 247 (D. Minn. 1930); see McCoy
v. Adams, 29 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
The above quoted passage from First Nat. Bk. v. Nat. Exch. Bk. was relied upon also
in State of Nebraska v. First Nat. Bk., 88 Fed. 947, 949 (C.C.D. Neb. 1898), and Second
Nat. Bk. v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 266 Fed. 489, 493 (4th Cir. 1920), appeal disnisscd,
254 U.S. 660 (1920). See Clement Nat. Bk. v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120, 140 (1913) ; Ald-
rich v. Chemical Nat. Bk., 176 U.S. 618 (1900). The rule is clear in Western Nat. Bk.
v. Armstrong,.152 U.S. 346, 351 (1893) and Auten v. United States Nat. Bk., 174 U.S. 125,
143 (1899). In the Autens case, the Court by its citation of Curtis z. Leazilt relied pri-
marily upon the New York Law as interpreted in that case.
Any implication in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934), that
the powers of National Banks are only those expressly granted to them, was eliminated in
Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940), where the prevailing opinion
did not accept the view of three dissenting Justices (id. at 526) that the "powers are only
those granted." Mr. Justice McReynolds, one of the dissenters, came right back within
a month with a dictum (as distinguished from the holding in the Inland Waterways Corp.
case) in Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U.S. 590, 596 (1940) : "The measure of their powers is
the statutory grant; and powers not conferred by Congress are denied."
In Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U.S. 262, 269 (1934), decided the same day as the Texas
& Pacific Ry. case, Mr. Justice Brandeis, who delivered the opinions in both cases, indi-
cated the broader view in ruling against a claimed power: "The contention that such
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from the interpretation of the New York statute by the New York
courts. It is submitted that the rule that statutory enactment of the
terms of a law previously interpreted adopts the interpretation, re-
quires the adoption of an interpretation of the National Bank Act to
accord with an established practice under the earlier New York statute,
provided it was not in conflict with the interpretation of the New York
statute by the New York courts. If it was the established practice
under New York law, prior to and at the time of the enactment of the
National Bank Act, for sight and time letters of credit to be issued as a
necessary incident to carrying on the banking business, then the pro-
visions of the National Bank Act must be interpreted as conferring
authority upon National Banks to issue such letters of credit (inasmuch
as such a practice would be in accord with the law as interpreted by
the New York courts). The present power of National Banks to issue
such letters of credit can thus be resolved as a mere question of fact-
namely, the determination of the actual practices of banks under the
New York law prior to 1863.29
It appears that the practice of issuing letters of credit by banks and
bankers, apparently including New York banks, existed prior to 1863. '
This finds confirmation in the continuance of the practice, especially
in large commercial ports such as New York City and after 1893, by
the National Banks which were most active in financing foreign trade
power is generally necessary in the business of deposit banking has not bewn sustained."
The same view has been adopted by some of the state courts. In First Nat. B!:. v.
Ocean Nat. Bk., 60 N.Y. 278, 287, 288 (1875), the court stated as to the defendant na-
tional bank: "The powers of the corporate defendant are banking powers only, with such
incidental powers as may be necessary to carry on the business of banldng, with the
privilege of buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion ... The statutory powers and
franchise are entirely coincidental with the attributes of banking corporations as defined
by the law merchant." (cf. id. at 294) Section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
24(1946)), which is substantially the same as the National Bank Act provision, has b-en
similarly interpreted. Fed. Res. Bk. v. Duffy, 210 N.C. 598, 602, 188 S.E. 82, S4 (1936).
In First Nat. Bk. v. Harris, 108 Mass. 514, 516 (1871) the court stated: "Dealing
in checks is also a part of the usual business of banking, and would be within the general
powers of a bank, without special mention."
28. See note 4 .mpra.
29. Cf. Inland W',aterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940): "Even con-
stitutional power, when the text is doubtful, may be established by usage."
30. "Letters of credit have been known and used from ancient times on the continent
of Europe and in England. In this country they have been used for a considerable period
of time in foreign transactions, but they did not come into general domestic use until the
outbreak of the war." [The First 'World War] Mead, Documentary Letters of Credit, 22
COL. L. R-v. 297, 298 (1922) ; see SToRy, BiLus OF EXCHnACXG §459 (4th ed. 1860), stat-
ing: "In respect to Letters of Credit, which are in common use in our commerce with
foreign countries... ;" RoEL.ER, 'MANUAL FOR Nor,, R= PUBLC AND B,%,.-ns 43
et seq. (3rd ed. 1855) ; Edmondston v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624 (U.S. 1831) ; Wildes v. Savage,
29 Fed. Cas. 1226, No. 17,653 (C.C. D. Mass. 1839) ; Baring v. Lyman, 2 Fed. Cas. 794,
No. 983 (C.C. D. Mass. 1841); GEORGE W. EDwARDS, FOREIGN COUMMICIAL CRMIaS 65
(1922).
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and travel. Many such letters provided for sight and time drafts
payable in foreign currencies. 31 Prior to 1914 export and import letters
of credit provided more frequently for sight drafts than for acceptances
by the issuer.32 The so-called "oriental letter of credit," in reality
merely an "Authority to Purchase," provided for acceptances, usually
with recourse to the drawer.3 3 After the enactment of the Federal
Reserve Act time letters of credit became more prevalent, but during
World War II sight letters were used almost exclusively.
In regard to the practice of issuing letters of credit by National
Banks in New York City, it is of some interest to note the remarks in
1922 (less than nine years after the enactment of the Federal Reserve
Act) of a New York court, with respect to a witness:
"He was thoroughly qualified to testify, having been assistant
cashier of the National Park Bank for 17 years, being familiar with
letters of credit and issuing same as part of his duties and passing on
the documents and drafts presented under such letters. He had is-
sued an average of about 500 letters of credit a month . . ...
The reported cases also show that it was established and publicly
31. WARD, AmERlCAN COMMERCIAL CREDITS 12-3 (1922); see 1 FED. REs. BULL. 269
(1915). The BANKERS DiaRcroY published semi-annually in Chicago by Rand McNally
& Co. contains advertisements of 45 National Banks advertising their issuance of letters of
credit prior to 1914. Such advertisements cover a period beginning with The First National
Bank of Chicago in June 1876. If the banking business were not carried on with a secrecy,
like that of a criminal enterprise, with respect to the general public, it would be public
knowledge, or a fact readily ascertainable from bank records, that beginning prior to 1870
and up through 1913 National Banks in this country issued hundreds of letters of credit
each year, including both commercial and travel letters, which prior to the end of the cen-
tury were for the most part for drafts payable in pounds sterling, but many of which were
for drafts payable in dollars. Not only was this true of National Banks in the large East-
ern and Southern ports, but the records of a leading inland National Bank show letters of
credit issued in the period to an aggregate value approaching $100,000,000.
32. See FED. REs. BULL. 686 (1921). But it appears that until at least 1870, the power
of National Banks to accept bills of exchange was never doubted. See Merchants' Bk. v.
State Bk., 10 Wall. 604, 647 (U. S. 1870) : "All the authorities, both English and Ameri-
can, hold that a check may be accepted, though acceptance is not usual .... [citing] Rob-
son v. Bennett, 2 Taunton, 395; Grant on Banking, 89; Ch. on Bills, 10 ed. 261; Boyd v.
Emmerson, 2 Adolphus & Ellis, 184; Kilsby v. Williams, 5 Barnewall & Alderson, 816,
Story on Promissory Notes, §§ 489, 490." Meads v. Merchants' Bk., 25 N.Y. 143, 150
(1862). See, also, Morse v. Massachusetts Nat. Bk., 17 Fed. Cas. 865, No. 9,857 (C.C.
D. Mass. 1873).
Promises by National Banks to pay drafts were considered valid acceptances. Se
Lindley v. First Nat. Bk., 76 Iowa 629, 41 N.W. 381 (1889) ; State Bk, of Fox Lake v.
Citizens' Nat. Bk., 114 Mo. App. 663, 90 S.W. 123 (1905). In 1882 acceptance of a check
by a National Bank was held by the Attorney General to be a certification within the
meaning of the statute forbidding certification except against deposited money. 17 Ox's.
Anr'y GEN. 471 (1882).
33. FED. REs. BULL 926 (1921).
34. Vietor v. National City Bk., 200 App. Div. 557, .72, 193 N.Y. Supp. 868, 878 (1st
Dep't 1922).
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recognized normal banking practice, prior to 1863, for banks to issue
letters of credit, travel and commercial, foreign and domestic 5 It was
based on banking procedure of bankers and merchants at least as far
back as the ancient GreeksY3
It thus appears that the New York banks interpreted their powers
conferred by the New York law as permitting the practice, and a re-
enactment of the terms of that law would adopt the same interpreta-
tion. The enactment of the National Bank Act in substantially the
terms of the New York Law not only adopted the interpretation of the
New York courts in Curtis v. Leavitt, but also adopted the interpreta-
tion which appears to have been followed in the practices of the New
York banks.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE AcT
The fifth paragraph of Section 13 of the original Federal Reserve
Act, enacted December 23, 1913,31 was as follows:
"Any member bank may accept drafts or bills of exchange drawn
upon it and growing out of transactions involving the importation
or exportation of goods having not more than six months sight
to run; but no bank shall accept such bills to an amount equal at
any time in the aggregate to more than one-half its paid-up capital
stock and surplus."
By successive amendments, the paragraph has become the seventh
paragraph of the Section and now provides:
[7. Acceptance of Drafts or Bills by member banks]
"Any member bank may accept drafts or bills of exchange drawn
upon it having not more than six months sight to run, exclusive of
days of grace, which grow out of transactions involving the im-
portation or exportation of goods; or which grow out of transactions
involving the domestic shipment of goods provided shipping doc-
uments conveying or securing title are attached at the time of ac-
ceptance; or which are secured at the time of acceptance by a ware-
house receipt or other such document conveying or securing
title covering readily marketable staples . . ." (The balance of the
35. Baring v. Lyman, 2 Fed. Cas. 794, No. 93 (C.C. D. Mass. 1S41); Wildes v.
Savage, 29 Fed. Cas. 1226, No. 17,653 (C.C. D. Mass. 1839).
36. Apparently credit was readily transferred or made available by a banker's letter
under the highly developed banking system evolved by the Greeks in their city states and
throughout the Mediterranean. EDimoxN GuILLARD, Las BAN2uimns Ami;u=:.s LT Ro-
MAtNs 1-24 (1875) (copy in the Seligman Collection, Columbia Univ.). He places the
beginnings of the banking business in the ancient cities of Asia Minor. Id. at 2. It is re-
grettable that his discussion of "la lettre de change" displays a scholar's typically lose
legal reasoning. Id. at 9-10, 41-4. See, also, V. DE KoTrroncA, Essmu HmsTofIQuE sun LnS
TRAP ZTES Er BANQUIERS D'ATRPNES (1859).
37. 38 StAr. 251 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1946).
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paragraph prescribes amended limitations upon the aggregate
amounts of such acceptances.)."s
These provisions expressly authorized the direct acceptance of drafts
of strictly limited types. It would seem fairly apparent that such pro-
visions were for the purpose not only of furnishing a self-liquidating
security but also of assuring the credit standing, in the domestic mar-
ket, of such member bank acceptances, and were not intended to affect
letters of credit, except possibly those letters of credit which provide
for acceptances by the issuing member bank. In providing by the Act
for the creation of a new and elastic currency based in part upon com-
mercial transactions, Congress envisioned the establishment of an
acceptance market somewhat similar to that which existed in Eng-
land.39 The effort of Congress to establish a short-term investment of
the highest quality was so successful that there is no recorded instance
of a holder in due course having lost a single dollar of principal through
United States bankers' acceptances. The Act made endorsed accept-
ances of the prescribed types eligible for discount by member banks
with Federal Reserve Banks, and for purchase by the latter in the open
market.
There is no evidence whatsoever that Congress intended to modify
the established practice of member banks in issuing sight letters of
credit. It is largely an unsupported assumption that Congress in-
tended to prescribe limitations upon acceptances drawn under time
letters of credit, even those drawn against, and for acceptance by, the
issuing member bank (as distinguished from those drawn against the
correspondent bank).
A statement by the New York Court of Appeals in Atterbury v.
Bank of Washington Heights is not entirely irrelevant:
". .. A trade acceptance is a form of obligation revived in this
country in recent years under the regulations of the Federal Re-
serve Bank Board . . . a bankers' acceptance is a draft or bill of
exchange of which the acceptor is a bank or banker engaged gener-
ally in the business of granting bankers' acceptance credits . .
(Italics Supplied).4 0
38. Paragraph 12 of Section 13 provides for acceptance by member banks of drafts
drawn upon them by banks and bankers abroad "for the purpose of furnishing dollar ex-
change." This authorization is confined to those countries where such acceptances are re-
quired by the usages of trade. Both these types of acceptances by member banks are regu-
lated by Regulation C of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
39. 24 COL. L. REv. 633-5 (1924). Rep. No. 69 of the Comnittce on Banking and Cijn-
rency, H.R. 7837, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1913), which ultimately became the Federal Re-
serve Act, listed as a need of the banking system: "6. Creation of market for commercial
paper"; namely, to open a market for bankers acceptances; SEN. REP. No, 133, 63d Cong,,
1st Sess. 26 (1913) ; WILLIS & STEINER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 463; WILLIS, op. Cit, sapra
note 3, at 981.
40. 241 N.Y. 231, 239, 149 N.E. 841 (1925).
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Even though Section 13 were interpreted as restricting all accept-
ances under letters of credit (both acceptances by the issuer and ac-
ceptances by the correspondent bank), there is no similar provision in
the Federal Reserve Act that could be interpreted as restricting sight
drafts. In fact, there is no mention in the Act of letters of credit of
any kind, except that corporations organized under the Act of Decem-
ber 24, 1919, to engage in international or foreign banking operations,
are expressly authorized, among many other specific powers, "to issue
letters of credit." -1 This provision of the 1919 statute is some indica-
tion that Congress deemed that National Banks had the power to issue
letters of credit without specific statutory authority, inasmuch as it
would appear that Congress did not contemplate any undue advantage
to such corporations over National Banks in this respect (and also
because Congress presumably knew of the established practice of
National Banks in issuing letters of credit).
It is submitted that a proper interpretation of the statutes would
be that there is but one limitation on the legal power of National Banks
to issue sight letters. It is improper practice and unsound banking for a
bank to issue a letter of credit which would make it possible for the
bank's customer to become liable, on account of paid drafts for which
the customer had not reimbursed the bank, in an amount greater than a
single obligor is allowed to incur under Section 5200 of the Revised
Statutes. This view is in accord with the ruling, of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in 1915, that the 10% limitation of Section 5200 did not apply
to an acceptance when made, but only to the indebtedness arising upon
maturity in case the drawer failed to furnish the funds for payment.
-42
41. 41 STAT. 378 (1919), 12 U.S.C. § 615 (1946).
42. FED. REs. BULL. 269 (1915). This joint ruling further stated that a National Bank
might lawfully issue a letter of credit providing for the making of it by acceptances over a
period of more than six months (the maximum time specified, Federal Reserve Act § 13,
for an accepted draft to run) provided no single acceptance thereunder exceeded that perio.l
The Board of Governors has also ruled that: "The limitations imposed by section 5200
of the Revised Statutes on the amount of money which may be borrowed by any individual
from a member bank do not apply to acceptances of such bank, i.e., the customer procuring
the acceptance has not borrowed money from the accepting bank but merely borrowed its
credit. After maturity, however, the liability incurred is a liability wvithin section 5200."
FED. REs. Buu.. 64 (1916); 197 (191S). In 1921 the Board ruled that "a member bank
should not obligate itself to accept drafts under a letter of credit to such an amount that it
is reasonable to anticipate that the aggregate amount of acceptances ... outstanding" will
exceed the limitation of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. FED. Rrs. BVL.x. 816
(1921). Also it would be an unsound banking practice for a bank to issue letters of credit
providing for the drawing of bills of exchange against itself or its correspondent banks in
an excessive amount relative to its worth. The Attorney General of the United States, in
an opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury, 27 Ops. A-r'y GE.. 601 (1909), which con-
sidered an application of Section 5200, stated that it is a "question . . of practical bank-
ing with respect to the means employed to minimize the chances of loans in excess of the
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It may be noted that the amount of acceptances (other than accept-
ances of checks, i.e., certifications) that a National Bank may have
outstanding is governed by Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act and
not by Section 5200 of the Revised Statutes, respecting obligations of a
single obligor, nor by Section 5202 of the Revised Statutes imposing
limitations upon the amount of liabilities incurred by a National
Bank.
43
In the light of the foregoing, it would seem that the provisions of
Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act did not create, by implication or
otherwise, a power to issue letters of credit covering the acceptance of
time drafts. It is clear that Section 13 has no relevancy at all to sight
(i.e., demand)-drafts, or letters of credit providing for them.
Judge L. Hand stated in his dissenting opinion in Pan-American
Bank & Trust v. National City Bank:
"I agree that paragraph 5 of section 13 of the Federal Reserve
Act (Comp. St. § 9764) applies only to acceptances proper; that is,
to acceptances payable on time, and not to sight drafts. The
language seems to me clear, and the Reserve Board has so ruled.
,, 44
Since National Banks had always had an implied power to issue
letters of credit providing for acceptances of time drafts of any type
(as well as letters of credit providing for the payment of sight drafts
of any type), there is some ground for the view that the authorization
in paragraph 7 of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act does not repeal
that power in whole or in part, and that the only proper implication
from the enactment of the (permissive)' authorization contained in
paragraph 7 is a limitation upon the types of bills that a member bank
is authorized to accept other than pursuant to a letter of credit issued
amount limited . . ." While the definition of "obligations" contained in Section 5200 is
literally confined to those of endorsers, drawers or guarantors, and of the maker or ac-
ceptor of discounted or sold paper, it would seem that any loan would be held to be within
the general intent of the section. Since the acceptance of a chcck has the legal effect of a
certification, it creates a liability within the limitations of Section 5202 of the Revised
Statutes. Since it is not a loan of money, but a loan of the credit of the bank, it is not
within the limitations of Section 5200. 17 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 471, 474 (1882). In New
York a letter of credit has, by statute, been included as a lending "directly or indirectly"
which is subject to the limitation upon lending to any single borrower. N. Y. BANKING
LAw § 103.
43. FrED. RE-s. BULL. 816 (1921); see Rule No. 49 of the Comptroller, CCH Fan.
BANKING LAW REP. 1 90,408 (1947) ; 17 OPs. ATr'Y GEN. 471 (1882).
44. 6 F.2d 762, 769 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925). Apparently
Judge Hand referred to the present paragraph 7. The fact that paragraph 7 expressly ap-
plies to "member" banks, which include state banks, is some evidence that Congress did
not consider it -was creating a new power to accept drafts. It is obvious that Congress has
no authority to create new corporate powers of banks incorporated under state law. Bilt
see FE. Ran. BuLL. 547, 816 (1921).
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by it; in other words, that paragraph 7 does not affect in any way the
power of National Banks to issue letters of credit providing for ac-
ceptances by them of types different from those specified in the para-
graph.
As against such an interpretation of paragraph 7, there are a number
of considerations. The authorization contained in the paragraph refers
to acceptances of bills "which grow out of transactions involving the
importation or exportation of goods." This describes the usual bills
drawn under commercial letters of credit in international commerce.
The legislative record indicates that at least some of the legislators
thought that the authorization created a new power in National
Banks,4 1 so that to that extent there may be an implication that Na-
tional Banks have no power to accept bills of other types than those
specified. It is clear that Congress did intend to create in this country
a type of bank acceptance of assured credit standing to be dealt in upon
an acceptance market similar to that which existed in England. All
these factors point to a Congressional intent that all acceptances by a
National Bank, including those pursuant to its letter of credit. should
conform to the types specified in paragraph 7. There is sufficient un-
certainty as to the meaning of the statute so as to give an administra-
tive body having jurisdiction of its administration some leeway in its
interpretation. It would seem that such a body might properly rule
that acceptances by a National Bank pursuant to its letter of credit
must conform to the terms of paragraph 7, however unsound a policy it
would be so to restrict commerce, and notwithstanding that the basic
intent of Congress in enacting that paragraph was to enlarge the
powers of member banks, not diminish them. It would seem rather
clear that an administrative body could not properly rule that the bills
accepted by a foreign correspondent bank, pursuant to a letter of credit
issued by a National Bank, must conform with the terms of the para-
graph. 4
6
45. See Rep. No. 69 on H.R. 7837, cited supra note 39, at 49, 52; 50 Co:.G. R.E. 4793
(1913); 51 CONG. Rc.m 282 (1913); 51 CoNG. REC. 1470 (1913). The idea that a new
power was created (see citations supra note 3) would appear to have been derived from a
single source-a misstatement, without reference to any authority, in a rerort of the Na-
tional Monetary Commission. Jacobs, Bank Acceptances, SEi. Doc. No. F69, 61st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1910). At page 4 thereof, it is stated: "In the United States the national bank act
does not permit banks to accept time bills drawvn on them. Although the act does not
specifically prohibit such acceptances, the courts have dceidcd that national ban.s hav'o no
power to make them." (Italics supplied). The assertion was quoted at page 49 of the Home
Report on H. R. 7837, cited supra note 39.
46. Following the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act a number of states enacted
statutes expressly authorizing banks to accept bills and issue letters of credit. Section 106
of the Banking Law of New York was amended in 1914, (presently § 96), by adding pro-
visions for New York State banks to become members of Federal Reserve Banks; by revis-
ing paragraph 1 of the section to more exactly conform to the first sentence of paragraph
"Seventh" of Section 5136; and by expressly authorizing acceptances and letters of credit.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58: 713
THE DECISIONS
Confusion as to the power of National Banks to issue letters of
credit, has been created by the failure to distinguish between a true
letter of credit and a guaranty. 47 The distinction is clearly stated in
the case of Border National Bank v. American National Bank.
4
1
The distinction between an unlawful guaranty and a lawful direct
obligation to pay (similar to that of the issuer of a letter of credit), is
brought out in a ruling of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. An inland member bank may not give to its corre-
spondent coastal bank a guaranty of the performance, by the customer
of the inland bank, of his obligation to the correspondent bank for a
letter of credit issued by the latter for the customer's account, but the
inland bank may become primarily liable to the coastal bank for the
advances made by the latter under the latter's letter of credit.'
It seems clear from the decision in Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1857), and the banking
business as carried on by New York and British banks, that this authorization was declara-
tory of the powers of New York banks. It no more created power to issue letters of credit
than it created their power to accept drafts. See First Nat. Bk. v. Ocean Nat. Bk., 60 N.Y.
278 (1875).
47. See dissent in Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bk., 94 Fed. 925 (9th Cir. 1899), cert. denied,
176 U.S. 682 (1900) ; Pan-American Bank v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 766 (2d Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925) ; FINKELSTEIN, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 19 n. 34;
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS § 54 n.1 (3d ed. 1928). Finkelstein states the law
dearly when he says at 32-3: "A letter of credit . . . is not ...a promise to pay if the
buyer does not pay, a promise made collaterally to the buyer's obligation, as further security
to the seller of the goods. The bank is neither a guarantor nor a surety, even though nor-
mally, as will be indicated presently, the buyer is not discharged by the issuance of a letter
of credit but continues bound to the seller under the sales contract. The issuing bank has
incurred a distinct, independent obligation contingent upon the performance of certain con-
ditions contained in the letter of credit. The rules governing the obligations of sureties
and guarantors have no application. . . ." Also id. at 33 n.22: "In this connection, it is
immaterial whether the buyer pays cash for the opening of the credit or whether the credit
is issued in reliance upon his undertaking to indemnify the bank, which may or may not re-
quire the deposit of collateral as additional security . . ."
48. 282 Fed. 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1922), writ of error dismissed and cert. dended, 260 U.S.
701, 732 (1922). The court stated: "A guaranty is a promise to answer for the payment of
some debt, or the performance of some obligation, in the case of the default of another per-
son, who is in the first instance liable for such payment or performance. A letter of credit
confers authority upon the person to whom it is addressed to advance money or furnish
goods on the credit of the writer . . .It is well settled that the guaranty of a national bank
is ultra vires . . . But a national bank is bound by its letter of credit. Decatur Bank v. St.
Louis Bank, 21 Wall. 294,-22 L. Ed. 560." The court pointed out the confusion which arises
from the loose use of the word "guaranty" (id. at 77-8) ; followed in Pan-American Bk.
v. National City Bk., 6 F.2d 762, 766 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925) ;
see FINKELSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15 n.23, at 32-3; ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING
§§ 5122, 5131 (1936). However the thoughtless confusion still continues. See Dunn v. Mc-
Coy, 113 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1940).
49. FED. RES. BULL. 547 (1921) ; cf. Pan-American Bank v. National City Bank, supra
note 48.
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In 1874, in the case of Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 9 cited in the
opinion in the Border National Bank case, a letter of credit issued by a
National Bank was enforced. In the trial court the defendant National
Bank interposed a plea to raise the issue that National Banks were
not authorized to issue letters of credit and that, therefore, the action
could not be sustained upon the defendant's letter of credit. Issue to
this plea was tendered by the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the attorney for
the National Bank argued before the Supreme Court that National
Banks did not have power to issue letters of credit inasmuch as such a
power was not found among their express powers nor was it "incidental
to any of the powers granted." The Court found that the letter was a
letter of credit, stating:
"The basis of this suit is the letter of credit of 13th September,
1869." .11
and gave judgment for the plaintiff. It fully enforced the letter of credit
without in any way relying upon an estoppel, or the production of any
evidence necessary to recovery upon an ultra vires contract. The Court
stated, however:
"It was urged at the bar that National banks are not authorized
to issue letters of credit, and if so, that the action cannot be sus-
tained. But the record does not raise the question, and it cannot,
therefore, be considered. It is true a plea was interposed which was
doubtless meant to raise it, on which, issue to the country [sic] was
tendered, but for aught that appears it was abandoned.
"No evidence was offered under it, but if this were not necessary
the attention of the court at least should have been called to it, and
proper instructions asked. If refused, error could have been as-
signed, and the point would then have been properly before the
court for decision.
"Nothing of the kind was done, and it is too late to raise the
question nww." 52
The Court indicated that the type of business involved in the case was
usually conducted on such letters of credit, for in referring to the re-
liance of the National Bank upon the security which was to accompany
the drafts, the Court stated:
"Indeed, the business in which Frederick was engaged is usually
conducted in this manner." 13
Inasmuch as it has been the general doctrine of the federal courts
that an ultra vires contract is void, and inasmuch as the Court in the
50. 21 Wall. 294 (U.S. 1874).
51. Id. at 298
52. Id. at 302.
53. Id. at 299.
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Decatur Bank case enforced the letter of credit on evidence which only
sustained the enforcement of an intra vires obligation, it has been proper
for the courts to consider the actual decision in that case to be authority
for the proposition that a letter of credit is not ultra ires of a National
Bank, even though the Court's reasoning on the point, expressed in its
opinion, was upon a premise involving a mere point of pleading. Under
the principle of stare decisis, such a decision standing alone would not
have conclusive weight on the issue of ultra vires. However, the inter-
pretation of the decision as an actual holding that the letter of credit
was intra vires, is supported by the Supreme Court's refusal of a writ of
error and certiorari in the Border National Bank case, where the deci-
sion in the Decatur Bank case was cited as establishing that proposi-
tion.14 The proposition may thus be deemed to have been settled law
at least since 1874. 5
Zollman, in Section 5122 of Banks and Banking, summarizes the
law as follows:
"A national or state bank or trust company clearly has no power
to guarantee contracts made by others ...
"However, the mere fact that a letter contains the word 'guar-
anty' or is limited in its operation to a particular article, such as a
road grader, does not constitute it a guaranty such as would be ultra
vires rather than a letter of credit which is within the powers of the
bank." (Italics supplied.)
In Section 5131 he points out that a letter of credit "is independent
of the contract of sale between the buyer and the seller and is un-
54. FINKELSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5 n.7, dismissed this case: "Decatur Bank
v. St. Louis Bank is not in point, as the court expressly refused to consider the problem."
This comment is without substance as it confuses the actual decision upon the evidence before
the Court, with the reasoning expressed in the Court's opinion.
55. Other cases have sustained the issuance by National Banks of sight letters of
credit. These are holdings that such issuance is within the inherent powers of such banks
inasmuch as the Federal Reserve Act has no relevancy to the issuance of sight letters of
credit. In Second Nat. Bk. v. M. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1926), the court
held a general letter of credit, which provided for sight drafts and was issued by the Irving
National Bank of New York City, a valid and enforceable contract regardless of whether
or not there was any payment or benefit to the issuer, or any estoppel. The decision is
clearly that the issuance was intra vires. It is significant that the letter of credit in that
cse, which was a "general" letter to any one acting upon it, had the high number: "No.
27439." In Union Fruit Producers, Inc. v. Plumb, 1 Wash.2d 278, 95 P.2d 1033 (1939),
the court held as to a letter, in the nature of a letter of credit, issued by a National Bank,
at 283: "The evidence in the case does not sustain appellant's second contention, that the
contract was ultra vires." Similarly, in Watson v. Jackson, 264 S.W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 699 (1925), a letter of credit issued by a National Bank, on
credit, to honor sight drafts was enforced as an intra ires contract. The court held at 611:
"The burden of proof was upon appellants to establish the plea of idira i res, and we do
not think they have discharged this burden ;" Nelson v. First Nat. Bk., of Chicago, 48 Ill.
36 (1868).
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affected by any breach of contract on the part of the seller or the
buyer . . . "and states:
"Unlike the case of a guaranty, evidence of any such contract
therefore is immaterial and inadmissible."
THE MYTEHOLOGY
The myths that grew up after the passage of the Federal Reserve
Act are stated in one of Finkelstein's notes:
"It is the generally accepted opinion that, prior to the enactment
of the Federal Reserve Act, national banks did not have the power
to accept time drafts or to issue letters of credit. Whitaker, Foreign
Exchange (1922) 134, n. 1; York, International Exchange (1923)
298 et seg.; Ward, American Commercial Credits (1922) c. I. How-
ever, since 1839 a few national banks had made use of foreign cred-
its to finance our importations. Although the question was never
directly passed upon in the Federal courts, that national banks did
not have such authority is implied in several decisions. Bowen v.
Needles Nat. Bank, 87 Fed. 430, 443 (C.C.S.D. Cal., 1898), aff'd,
94 Fed. 925 (C.C.A. 9th, 1899), cert. den. 176 U.S. 682, 20 Sup.
Ct. 1024 (1900); Merchants' Bank v. Baird, 160 Fed. 642, 17
L.R.A. (N.S.) 526 (C.C.A. 8th, 1908); see Thilmany v. Iowa Paper
Bag Co., 108 Iowa 333, 79 N.W. 68 (1899), a decision by a state
court to the effect that national banks could not issue letters of
credit. See also Commercial Nat. Bankv. Pirie, 82 Fed. 799 (C.C.A.
8th, 1897). The general basis for this prohibition was the rule that
banks could not lend their credit, 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th
ed. 1928) § 65. Accordingly, as is indicated in several of the cases
cited, a bank could probably issue letters of credit against cash or
its equivalent, or undertake to honor drafts when put in funds by
its depositor, see First Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 7 IV.
Va. 544 (1874). Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank is not in point, as
the court expressly refused to consider the problem, 21 Wall. 294,
302, 22 L. Ed. 560, 562 (1874)." t
Every one of the propositions in this quotation is either misleading
or incorrect.
The first proposition, that National Banks did not have power to
accept time drafts, is a paraphrase of the Whitaker citation for it.
Recognizing the logic that, if a bank could not accept drafts, it could
not issue letters of credit providing for such acceptances (and that it
would have no greater power to issue sight letters of credit), Finkelstein
added to Whitaker's statement that National Banks had no power to
issue letters of credit. Whitaker states in the note which is cited: "It is
the generally accepted opinion that prior to the enactment of the recent
banking reform laws, national banks in the United States (or those
56. FixxELSTEIN, T, GAL AspEcrs OF Co mcrA.L LErTms OF Cnmrr 5 n.7 (1930).
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chartered by the Federal government) did not have the legal power to
submit to or accept time drafts." However, he adds in the same
note: ". . . it may safely be said this mere legal disability of our lead-
ing class of banks had little or nothing to do with the failure up to that
time of the acceptance business to develop in this country." The
looseness of this language in its possible implication that if they had
thought it advantageous, National Banks would have accepted time
bills even though they had no legal power to do so, may be due to the
fact that Mr. Whitaker was a professor of economics, and apparently
not a professor of law or a practicing attorney. It seems that his basic
fact was that for nonlegal reasons no substantial acceptance business
had developed. His statement as to legal power to accept bills is,
therefore, more or less gratuitous, and it is entirely unsupported.
Whitaker says nothing in his note concerning letters of credit. His
preceding discussion, 51 however, indicates that all classes of American
banks issued letters of credit before 1914. Moreover, the text to which
the note applies is as follows:
". .. In this instance we have an American bank providing for
an American importation by authorizing a draft on itself payable
in American dollars, while in the former case we had simply an Eng-
lish bank providing for an English importation by authorizing a
draft on itself payable in English pounds. But under ante-bellum
conditions, and these were conditions that had persisted for a long
period and had become normalized, neither the banks in the United
States nor those in most countries other than England did much
business in credits permitting time drafts upon themselves. In-
stead they issued in the great majority of cases what are called 'sterling
credits.' These comprise any credits under which the beneficiaries
are empowered to draw drafts in pounds on English banks, whether
the authorization issues from the English banks themselves or with
their permission from banks in other countries. There are also simi-
lar and self-explanatory terms such as 'dollar credits,' 'franc
credits,' and so on. Before the war American banks were driving a
large and ever-increasing traffic with our importers in commercial
credits, as we call them, but the vastly preponderating part of these
were sterling credits. A few were franc or mark credits, while al-
most none were dollar credits. .... .1
"Mr. H. K. Brooks says in his 'Foreign Exchange Text-Book'
(dated 1906) that 'probably ninety per cent of all letters of credit
issued throughout the world are drawn in English money' (page 7).
This signifies not that ninety per cent of the world's commerce is
settled through London, but merely that ninety per cent of the
commercial and travelers' letters of credit are for sterling ... "
(Italics supplied.)
,57. WHITAKER, FOREIGN EXCHANGE 131-3 (1919).
58. Id. at 134.
59. Id. at 135-6.
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Whitaker includes in his text, as a sample of a typical sterling letter
of credit used for imports into the United States, a formal letter of
credit issued by a National Bank at Chicago, dated July 1, xg93 (prior
to the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act) and providing for drafts
at sixty days sight on a London bank. The text CO shows that the letter
was issued on credit. It is clear, therefore, that Finkelstein's assertion
of a lack of legal power to issue letters of credit is in conflict with the
very authority upon which he primarily relies.
York, International Exchange, is the second citation for the first of
Finkelstein's propositions. The book is on foreign exchange. It is
stated, on the first page cited, 61 referring to the First World War:
"Prior to the war the foreign trade of the United States was
financed almost entirely by means of foreign currency bills, drawn
either on the buyers, here or abroad, or on overseas banks under
commercial letters of credit. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
In cases of drafts drawn on overseas banks under commercial letters
of credit, indubitably most of those which covered imports into the
United States were issued by American banks. 2
As to the acceptance of bills, York, who was Foreign Exchange
Editor of the Vall Street Journal, states:
". .. Prior to the war American chartered banks lacked the
legal authority to accept bills of exchange under commercial credits
or otherwise, while the great international banking houses of the
country, which labored under no such disability, did not make a
practice of extending this manner of accommodation. This legal
handicap so far as the national banks were concerned was removed
by the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, which authorized them
to accept bills drawn against them for commercial purposes, includ-
ing those growing out of the exportation and importation of mer-
chandise. The example of Congress was soon followed by a number
of states, which granted a similar power to the banking institutions
under their jurisdiction .... ,, 63
This is an unsupported statement, which like Vhitaker's would seem
based more upon banking practice than upon legal power. In any
event, in view of his earlier statement, to the effect that American
banks issued letters of credit providing for acceptances by overseas
banks, York must have thought that any lack of legal power to accept
60. Id. at 136, 147-50.
61. YoRK, INTr.RNATioNAL EXCHANGE 29S (1923).
62. JAcoBs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12, stated the practice followed in 1910 and previ-
ously. He pointed out that the United States importer has "his bank arrange a credit with
its London correspondent. He receives an undertaking, called a commercial letter of credit
... On the strength of such a letter of credit, the shipper... is able to dispose of his
bills on London and thus receive immediate payment for his goods."
63. Yopa, op. dt. supra note 61, at 299.
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a bill did not affect the power of a bank to issue a letter of credit pro-
viding for acceptances by a correspondent bank.
The last citation for Finkelstein's first proposition is Chapter I of
'Ward, American Commercial Credits. Although Mr. Ward is a member
of the New York bar, he spoke from his practicing banker's experience
following the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act." In this first
edition of his work, he stated, with respect to the period preceding 1914:
"Our national banks were not at that time permitted by law to
accept time drafts. There was no obstacle to the acceptance of bills
by private bankers, but the lack of anything approaching a dis-
count market for these bills in New York was as effective as legal
prohibition in keeping private bankers' acceptances from being
created." 15
He pointed out, however, that:
"It was the lack of a discount market like that of London, Paris,
or Berlin, which more than anything else made the acceptance of a
New York bank useless as an instrument of finance ...
"The passage in 1913 of the Federal Reserve Act laid the basis
upon which it was possible to develop in New York this sort of dis-
count market that is indispensable to the creation of a center of
international finance." 68
As to the power of National Banks to issue letters of credit before
1914, Ward records 11 the growth in the issuance of commercial letters
of credit by such banks in New York City from 1893 to 1913.
It may be true that in 1913 it was the general idea of many, if not
most, bankers that National Banks did not have the power to accept
bills of exchange. However, the decisions of the courts and the history
of the National Bank Act, seem never to have been considered by them.
The idea would appear, therefore, to have stemmed from the strong
antipathy of the American banker to that form of extension of credit.
As stated by Ward, 8 the general practice of American banks was to
rely upon promissory notes and their discount, instead of trade and
bank acceptances.
The provincial attitude of American bankers is reflected in Mr. Paul
M. Warburg's Foreword to the first edition of Ward's book. He there
states: 9
"It is difficult for us to realize how radical the change in Ameri-
64. VAID, AMEMICAN CommEmcIuL CpmiTs 6 (1922).
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 14-5.
67. Id. at 12-3.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at ifi-iv.
[Vol, 58: 713
1949] BANKS POWER TO ISSUE LETTERS OF CREDIT 737
can banking psychology has been since the enactment of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act. When in 1914 the power to extend credits by the
granting of bankers' acceptances was given to national banks, the
majority of our leading bankers looked askance upon this new privi-
lege, and some of them, indeed not the smallest amongst them,
stated in no uncertain terms that as far as their bank was con-
cerned it would never avail itself of this power. The result was
that for the year 1914, open-market purchases by federal reserve
banks was insignificant; by the end of 1915 it did not exceed 865,-
000,000; and by the end of 1916 it had reached $385,000,000, still
a comparatively small figure for a country of the vast resources of
ours7
"During all these years officials of the federal reserve system
kept on preaching the gospel of bankers' acceptance credits, try-
ing to persuade banks to do their part in supplanting foreign accept-
ance credits by those issued by our own banks. Real headway in
this regard was made only in 1917 when the formation of large ac-
ceptance credit syndicates began to popularize acceptance banking
amongst American banks. .. ."
It follows that Finkelstein's assertion, that prior to the enactment
of the Federal Reserve Act National Banks did not have the power to
issue letters of credit, is not only unsupported by the authorities he
cites but is contrary to them. None of his citations raises the slightest
doubt as to the power of National Banks, prior to 1913, to issue letters
of credit which provided for sight and time drafts upon their foreign
correspondent banks. His similar statement as to the power of Ameri-
can banks to accept drafts drawn upon themselves is a repetition of
laymen's views, without any attempt at support by legal authority.
In so far as it implies that National Banks had no power to issue letters
of credit providing for acceptances of time bills by a correspondent
bank, it is in conflict with the authorities he cites.
While the writers referred to by Finkelstein, in spite of the decisions
and banking statutes, have doubted the authority of National Banks
to make direct acceptances prior to 1913, and some members of Con-
gress, at the time of the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, ac-
cepted the view that National Banks had no such authority,71 no deci-
sion is cited by any of such writers, or in any of the records, which held
that National Banks did not have power, prior to 1913, to issue letters
of credit addressed to foreign banks, or other banks, providing for ac-
ceptances by such correspondent banks, and whereby the issuer did
undertake to accept drafts drawn by the correspondent against the
issuer in like amount.
Finkelstein is correct in stating that since 1839 some National Banks
70. The high of bank acceptances outstanding vas over $1,700,000,000. It -was reached
at the close of 1929.
71. See note 45 s=pra.
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had made use of foreign credits to finance our importations, but he
would have presented a clearer picture if he had stated that prior to
1894 the National Banks in New York City began issuing numerous
commercial letters of credit to finance imports by drafts drawn on
foreign correspondents under letters of credit.7 2 His statement that
several decisions implied that National Banks did not have authority
to issue such letters of credit is not borne out by his citations. Both
the Bowen case and the Merchants Bank case dealt only with unlawful
guaranties. No implication has been found in either, that National
Banks had no power to issue a true letter of credit, commercial or
travel. The Thilmany case is not (as asserted by Finkelstein) a decision
that National Banks could not issue letters of credit; that conclusion
was a mere dictum. The court in Commercial National Bank v. Pirie
merely held that a guaranty by a National Bank "made for the sole
benefit and advantage of others" was not binding, and said nothing
as to letters of credit. On the other hand, in Border National Bank v.
American National Bank, supra, a federal court in 1922 directly passed
upon the question of the power of National Banks, prior to the enact-
ment of the Federal Reserve Act, to issue letters of credit, to the extent
at least that it cited the Decatur Bank case of 1874 as establishing the
law to that effect. As pointed out above, the Decatur Bank case is in
point on that proposition since the Court enforced a letter of credit
issued by a National Bank on credit.
Since it is difficult to imagine any ground upon which a bank could
not undertake any legitimate financial obligation that did not exceed
an amount of cash paid to it therefor, it seems somewhat naive for
Finkelstein to state that several cases "indicated" that "a bank could
probably issue letters of credit against cash or its equivalent or under-
take to honor drafts when put in funds by its depositor. . . ." 11 He
later indicates, however, that no distinction, as to the validity of letters
72. WARD, op. cit. supra note 64, at 12-3; see note 62 supra. There were, of course, no
National Banks "since 1839," until the Act of 1863 (and no bank chartered by Act of Con-
gress in that period). Some state banks used the word "national" in their names. DILIS-
TIN, HisTORicAL DiREcTORy OF THE BANKS OF THE STATE OF Nmv YOuK 54 (1946).
73. It appears that the court in the Thihnany case, (108 Iowa 333, 79 N.W, 68
(1899)), is the only court that has ever expressed the view that National Banks had tio
power to issue letters of credit prior to 1913 except when paid in cash, at the time of issu-
ance, of the full amount of the bank's possible future liability thereunder. It was a dictum
of a confused state court in Iowa fifty years ago, without the citation of any supporting
authority. It has never been followed. It reflected the court's complete ignorance of the
universal procedures for the carrying on of import and export trade. MEAD, op. Cit. siupra
note 30, at 302, points out that: ". . . it is very seldom that the issuing bank has received
from the buyer of the goods any funds in advance of the issuance of the credit." McCurdy
states, as to an import acceptance letter of credit (35 HARV. L. Rnv. 553 (1922)) : "Actual
cash is practically never paid by the buyer for the letter of credit. Nor is a present loan
arranged. The commission may, however, be paid in advance." If cash were deposited,
there would be no need for a commercial letter of credit. See Cutler v. Am. Exch, Nat.
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of credit, can be drawn between letters of credit issued for cash and
those which are not.
74
The First National Bank case (entitled in the West Virginia reports,
M21erclzants National Bank v. First National Bank), cited by Finkelstein
as supporting the authority of a bank to accept when put in funds, in-
volved the federal statute making it unlawful for a National Bank to
certify checks except against funds on deposit with it, an entirely
irrelevant subject.
75
No case in the United States has been found where a court has failed
to enforce a sight or time letter of credit either on the ground that it
was ultra vires or that it was issued without cash payment therefor and
contemplated an extension of credit instead. The term "letter of
credit" is here used in its accurate sense excluding guaranties.
If a letter of credit is considered an instrument of the Law Merchant,
cash payment upon its issuance is no more relevant to its validity and
enforceability than full cash consideration is relevant to a bill of ex-
change in the hands of a bona fide holder for value. Even if not con-
sidered an instrument governed by the Law Merchant, the issuance of
letters of credit upon a credit basis has for centuries been a necessary
incident to a fully developed banking business. Cash payment on
issuance is, therefore, irrelevant upon the question of ultra vires with
respect to a bank which has the express or implied "power to carry on
the business of banking . . . by exercising such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on such business." 7 The power to issue a
letter of credit upon a credit basis is historically as much an essential
incident of the banking business as is the power to borrow money 17
and is similar to the power to draw a time bill of exchange. 7
The view that prior to the Federal Reserve Act the issuance of letters
of credit by National Banks other than for cash was ultra vires is ap-
parently based upon the erroneous conception that a letter of credit is
a "lending of the bank's credit" 71 of the same nature as a guaranty by
the bank of the performance of another's obligation. A guaranty, of
course, is in ordinary circumstances ultra vires of any bank, and of
most other corporations. The erroneous concept that cash payment is
material to a letter of credit apparently arises from the law that some
Bk., 113 N.Y. 593, 21 N.E. 710 (1889), where the bank sent a letter advising of a special
deposit, in the nature of a trust fund.
74. Fixncs=Nu, op. cit. supra note 56, at 32 n. 22, quoted note 47 supra.
75. A practice of using an acceptance, in lieu of a certification "good," apparently de-
veloped in attempts to avoid the original 1869 Statute. 15 STAT. 335 (1269) ; now covered
by 12 U.S.C. 501 (1946). KNox, op. cit. supra note 17, at 184-5.
76. N.Y. Laws 1838, c.260, § 18.
77. Cf. Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9 (1S57).
78. See id. at 167, 169, 222-5, 243, 260.
79. See 24 COL. L. R-v. 635-6 (1924).
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bank guaranties, and other corporate guaranties, are intra vires, or at
least sustain a recovery, when issued under circumstances which re-
sult, or may be reasonably expected to result, in a sufficient benefit to
the issuing bank (or other issuing corporation)."o
As Finkelstein elsewhere says, with respect to an irrevocable export
letter of credit:
"It is highly important to note that the bank has not in this
case guaranteed or acted as surety for the performance of any act by
the buyer. The bank has merely undertaken to perform a certain
act, e.g., accept a draft upon the performance of certain condi-
tions by the seller or beneficiary. This distinction is legally of the
utmost significance .... ,, 81 (Italics supplied.)
There is no prohibition against the issuance of letters of credit on the
ground that a bank cannot lend its credit, 2 and the citation from Morse
in the first quotation above from Finkelstein does not support his
assertion that there is. Instead of supporting his statement, Section 65
of Morse does not contain any express or implied statement to the
effect that National Banks lack the power to issue letters of credit on
the ground that they are a lending of the bank's credit, or on any other
ground. On the contrary, the Section expressly states:
"A national bank is bound by its letter of credit ...
"The rule of ultra vires as applied to a bank's guaranty, does not
apply to its letter of credit."
CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Field once used words which may be applied to the
doctrine that National Banks had no power to accept drafts prior to
1913 and, more appropriately, to the doctrine that their implied powers
are limited to those which are incidental to their express powers. He
said:
"I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating
this doctrine. . . .And I confess that, moved and governed by the
authority of the great names of those judges, I have, myself, in
many instances, unhesitatingly and confidently, but I think now
erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But, notwithstanding
the great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and
notwithstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been
80. See Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bk., 94 Fed. 925 (9th Cir. 1899), cert. denied, 176
U.S. 682 (1900).
81. FINKEsTEI', op. cit. supra note 56, at 15 n. 23.
82. Cf. Federal Intermediate Credit Bk. v. L'Herisson, 33 F2d 841, 847 (8th Cir.
1929).
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reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repeti-
tion, the Constitution of the United States. .. ." 83
For present purposes, the phrase "the established rules of law" can be
substituted for "the Constitution of the United States." It may be
hoped that as our civilization becomes one based more on reason and
less on historical accident, this frank recognition of past error will
attain classic status.
Ward and Harfield, in the latest edition of Ward's book,8 completely
disagree with the old mythology. They recognize that National Banks
have inherent power to issue letters of credit providing for sight drafts
and acceptances and that such power was not created by the Federal
Reserve Act. Citing Finkelstein's note 7 quoted above, they state: 5
"Most textbook writers seem to be of the view that prior to the enact-
ment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 national banks did not have
power to accept time drafts nor to issue letters of credit." They follow
this with their own present conclusion: "Actually the power to issue
letters of credit is inherent in the general banking power to deal in
credit." They accept Professor Llewellyn's opinion: " "In result, I
find no aspect or probably [sic] credit practice whose availability to
national banks depends, as a question of power, on the Federal Reserve
Act. That power derives instead from the nature of the business of
banking." They add: "By whatever means the result has been ob-
tained, it now seems clear that no question can properly be raised as to
the inherent power of banks to issue letters of credit of any character
and upon any terms, subject only to express limitations in the charters
of the banks or to express statutory or administrative restrictions
which are based upon the soundness of the practice and not upon the
underlying power." 87
83. Dissenting opinion, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 36S, 401 (1¢V93).
Mr. Justice Brandeis admired this passage and used it in Eric Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
84. WARD AND HA_ FmrE, op. cit. supra note 3.
85. Id. at 88.
F6. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 73-4.
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